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Beyond a Sour Lemon: A Look at Grumet v. 
Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village 
School District* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Founding Fathers sought to guard against the public-
ly-aided institution of one or more religions. They guaranteed 
religious freedom through the Constitution, mandating that 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion."1 With this safeguard, called the Establishment 
Clause, American citizens would be free from compulsion to 
join a particular religion or to support a religious entity to 
which they did not belong through paying taxes. The United 
States Supreme Court has, in recent years, construed the Es-
tablishment Clause to preclude the noncoercive religious ac-
commodation which both the Founding Fathers and prior 
Courts have favored,2 contorting the First Amendment's guar-
antee of religious freedom. By interpreting the Establishment 
Clause in a narrow fashion, the judiciary has failed to accom-
modate the religious needs of our country's diverse citizenry. 
The three-part test codified in the landmark case of Lemon v. 
Kurtzman3 has given rise to great difficulty in adjudicating 
Establishment Clause cases, thus warping the First 
Amendment's guarantee.4 
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals applied the Lem-
on5 test in Grumet v. Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel 
* An earlier draft of this paper constituted the initial draft of an amicus 
brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court in support of Petitioners, Board 
of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School District, et al. The brief was 
submitted by the Institute for Religion and Polity, a non-profit, non-partisan 
organization committed to the study of religious values and contemporary church-
state relations. 
The author would like to thank Ronald D. Maines, a very skillful practitioner, 
and Professors Frederick M. Gedicks and David A. Thomas for both their 
inspiration and insight. The author takes full responsibility for the opinions (and 
errors) herein. 
1 U.S. CaNST. amend. I. 
2 See discussion infra part IV. 
3 403 u.s. 602 (1971). 
4 See discussion infra part III. 
5 See discussion infra part II. 
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Village School District6• In so doing, it perpetuated the current 
problems involved in Establishment jurisprudence.7 In a word, 
Lemon and Grumet do not square with the original rationales 
for enacting the Establishment Clause. 
In general, this Note analyzes Establishment jurisprudence 
and the Supreme Court's shortcomings with respect to 
noncoercive religious accommodation. It will explore the inade-
quacies of the Lemon test in adjudicating Establishment cases 
and will suggest an alternative formulation based upon 
noncoercion. More specifically, this Note examines the constitu-
tionality of the Kiryas Joel Village School District, a secular 
public school district which is presently entirely composed of 
children of one religious background. Part II of this Note exam-
ines the reasoning in Grumet, and Part III shows why the New 
York high court's reliance on the Lemon test is problematic. 
Part IV affirms the coercion element as a valid test that fulfills 
both current societal needs and originalist rationales for the 
Establishment Clause. Finally, Part V explores the need for 
religious accommodation without coercion, discussing Grumet 
in light of the Establishment Clause's adjudicative history. This 
Note concludes that the Court should take the opportunity this 
term, when deciding Grumet,8 to reexamine the Lemon test 
and reformulate its Establishment jurisprudence by espousing 
an accommodationist/noncoercion paradigm. If not, the Religion 
Clauses, particularly the Establishment Clause, cannot provide 
the constitutional guarantees the Founding Fathers intended. 
II. THE SUPPOSED EFFECT OF AN ESTABLISHMENT IN GRUMET 
A. The Facts 
The Village of Kiryas Joel is a religious enclave. Located in 
the town of Monroe, Orange County, New York, its inhabitants 
are almost entirely members of the Satmarer Hasidim, a sect of 
the Jewish faith. 9 The principal language of the village is Yid-
dish.10 The Satmarer, in addition to separation from an out-
side community, practice separation between sects and follow a 
6 618 N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993). 
7 See discussion infra part V. 
8 618 N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993). 
9 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 96-97. 
10 ld. at 96. 
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male and female dress code. 11 Radio, vision, and publications 
in English are not widely used. 12 
Most children in the Kiryas Joel Village receive their edu-
cation in private religious schools. 13 Prior to the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Aguilar v. Felton, 14 special educa-
tion personnel from the Monroe-Woodbury Central School Dis-
trict taught the handicapped Satmarer Hasidic children in an 
annex to one of the village's religious schools. 15 In 1985, the 
Aguilar Court held that this arrangement was a violation of 
the Establishment Clause. The Aguilar Court held Title I of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 violated the 
Establishment Clause because the Act authorized federally-
funded salaries for public employees who taught in parochial 
schools. 16 The Court stated: "[ w ]e have long recognized that 
underlying the Establishment Clause is the 'objective . . . to 
prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or 
state] into the precincts of the other."'17 In response to 
Aguilar, the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District discon-
tinued its teaching arrangement for the handicapped children 
at the private school annex in Kiryas Joel. 18 
"For some time thereafter, some of the handicapped 
Satmarer Hasidic children attended special education classes 
held at the Monroe-Woodbury public schools."19 But litigation 
ensued because the Satmarer Hasidim disagreed with the idea 
of sending their handicapped children to school outside their 
religious enclave. In Board of Education v. Wieder,20 the New 
York Court of Appeals noted that, "allegedly because of the 
'panic, fear and trauma [the children] suffered in leaving their 
own community and being with people whose ways were so 
different from theirs,' the parents stopped sending them to 
programs offered at the public schools."21 The Wieder court 
held that Education Law § 3602-c(2),22 authorizing special 
11 !d. 
12 !d. 
13 !d. 
14 4 73 U.S. 402 (1985). 
15 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 96-97. 
16 Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413-14. 
17 !d. at 413 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)). 
18 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 97. 
19 !d. 
20 527 N.E.2d 767, 770 (N.Y. 1988). 
21 !d., noted in Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 97. 
22 "Education Law § 3602-c(2) provides, in part: 'Boards of education of all 
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education services to private school handicapped children, al-
lowed boards of education to furnish those services in regular 
public school classes or to provide otherwise.23 
As a result, the New York legislature enacted Chapter 748 
of the Laws of 1989, creating the Kiryas Joel Village School 
District, a new union free school district.24 The district was 
coterminous with the boundaries of the incorporated Satmarer 
Hasidic village and was created within Monroe-Woodbury Cen-
tral School District boundaries.25 Chapter 748 also instituted 
a school board whose five to nine members would serve a peri-
od not exceeding five years and would be elected by the voters 
of Kiryas Joel.26 Chapter 748 sought to resolve a longstanding 
conflict between the Monroe-Woodbury School District and the 
village of Kiryas Joel, whose population are all members of the 
same religious sect.27 
Louis Grumet, Executive Director of the New York State 
School Boards Association, and Albert Hawk, President of the 
New York State School Boards Association, brought suit 
against the New York State Education Department and several 
state officials. Plaintiffs, both as citizen taxpayers and in their 
state educational capacities, argued that Chapter 748 violated 
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. 28 Both the 
Board of Education of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School 
District and the Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village 
School District intervened as defendants. 29 
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the 
Supreme Court Appellate Division,30 holding that Chapter 748 
could not withstand constitutional scrutiny as it violated the 
Supreme Court's three-part test given in Lemon v. Kurtzman: 
school districts of the state shall furnish services to pupils who are residents of 
this state and who attend non-public schools located in such school districts, upon 
the written request of the parent, guardian or persons legally having custody of 
any such pupil.' Section 3602-c(l)(a) defines 'services' as 'instruction in the areas of 
gifted pupils, occupational and vocational education and education for students with 
handicapping conditions.'" Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 97 n.3. 
324). 
23 Wieder, 527 N.E.2d at 772, noted in Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 97. 
24 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 97. 
25 !d. 
26 !d. 
27 [d. at 97 (citing Governor's Approval Mem., 1989 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN., at 
28 !d. 
29 !d. 
30 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 
N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
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"[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not 
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion."'3t 
B. The New York Court of Appeals' Reasoning in Grumet 
The New York Court of Appeals specifically addressed 
Lemon's "effects" prong in its analysis.32 The court also cited 
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,33 affirming that govern-
ment promotes religion: 
when it fosters a close identification of its powers and respon-
sibilities with those of any-or all-religious denominations 
as when it attempts to inculcate specific religious doctrines. If 
this identification conveys a message of government endorse-
ment or disapproval of religion, a core purpose of the Estab-
lishment Clause is violated.34 
The court noted that, in considering whether a statute has the 
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, the consider-
ation is "whether the symbolic union of church and state effect-
ed by the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely 
to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations 
as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, 
of their individual religious choices."35 In sum, context will 
determine whether a particular governmental action will likely 
be perceived as a religious endorsement.36 The state's high 
court reasoned that "[g]overnmental action 'endorses' religion if 
it favors, prefers, or promotes it."37 
The New York Court of Appeals stated that "only Hasidic 
children will attend the public schools in the newly established 
31 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted), noted 
in Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 98. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 
(1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). 
32 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 99. 
33 473 u.s. 373, 389 (1985). 
34 ld. at 389 (citations omitted). 
35 ld. at 390. Despite this oft-quoted language, the Court has never adopted 
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test. See discussion infra part V.B. 
36 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 
573, 595-97 (1989). 
37 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 99. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 
(1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 691 (1984). 
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school district, and only members of the Hasidic sect will likely 
serve on the school board."38 As a result, the court concluded 
that: 
this symbolic union of church and State effected by the estab-
lishment of the Kiryas Joel Village School District under 
Chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989 is sufficiently likely to be 
perceived by the Satmarer Hasidim as an endorsement of 
their religious choices, or by nonadherents as a disapproval of 
their individual religious choices.39 
The majority40 countered the dissent's argumene1 that 
Chapter 748 was analogous to the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.42 In 
Zobrest, a sign language interpreter was to be assigned to a 
handicapped student attending a religious high school; the 
Court held this to be a neutral benefit.43 The Grumet court 
held that a school district coterminous with the boundaries of a 
religious community could not be confused with the design of 
"neutral" governmental benefits found in Zobrest. By creating 
the school district in Kiryas Joel, the government is not offer-
ing "a neutral service ... as part of a general program that 'is 
in no way skewed towards religion."'44 
The court rejected the dissent's contention45 that Chapter 
748, like the provision of services construed in Wolman v. 
Walter,46 gave rise to a "unit on a neutral site" serving "sec-
tarian pupils."47 The Grumet court held that Chapter 748 did 
not have the primary effect of providing services to handi-
capped children, because it yields: 
to the demands of a religious community whose separatist 
tenets create a tension between the needs of its handicapped 
children and the need to adhere to certain religious practices. 
Regardless of any beneficent purpose behind the legislation, 
the primary effect of such an extensive effort to accommodate 
38 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 100. 
39 ld. 
40 ld. 
41 ld. at 116 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). See discussion infra part V.C. 
42 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993). 
43 ld. at 2463. 
44 ld. at 2467, noted in Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 100-01. 
45 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 116 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). See discussion infra 
part V.B. 
46 433 u.s. 229 (1977). 
47 ld. at 247, noted in Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 101. 
531] ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
the desire to insulate the Satmarer Hasidic students inescap-
ably conveys a message of governmental endorsement of reli-
gion.4s 
537 
The majority concluded that its decision did not "penalize 
and encumber religious uniqueness" as the dissenting opinion 
argued.49 In closing, the court of appeals reiterated: "[s]pecial 
services are made available to the Satmarer student within the 
Monroe-Woodbury School District. Our decision does not im-
pose any additional burdens on the students within Kiryas 
Joel; it simply determines that the Legislature may not treat 
the Satmarer community as separate, distinct and entitled to 
special accommodation."50 
III. LEMON'S INFIRMITY 
The United States Supreme Court recently granted certio-
rari in Grumet.51 With this case, the Court should reexamine 
the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.52 Despite three de-
cades of use, the Court must reconsider the Lemon test because 
of the disparate results it has engendered,53 the inconsisten-
cies of its application,54 and its unpopularity among a majori-
ty of current Justices. 55 
The Establishment jurisprudential spectrum includes is-
sues such as legislative prayer56 and tuition subsidies to par-
ents of parochial school children.57 The spectrum also includes 
the more arduous church-state issues-graduation prayer,58 
prayer in schools,59 and display of religious material in public 
48 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 101. 
49 ld. at 118 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). See discussion infra part V. 
50 ld. at 101. 
51 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618 
N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993). 
52 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
53 See discussion infra part liLA. 
54 See discussion infra part III.B. 
55 See discussion infra part III.C. 
56 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (declaring constitutional the his-
torical use of prayer to open legislative sessions). 
57 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (granting tax deductions to parents 
of private- or public-school children for tuition). 
58 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (holding unconstitutional clergy-
offered prayers at high school graduation). 
59 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama statute 
authorizing voluntary prayer or meditation in schools). See also Abington Sch. Dist. 
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fora. 60 If violative of the Constitution, creation of the Kiryas 
Joel Village School District could be seen as one of the more 
egregious Establishment Clause infractions in light of Lemon. 
But, rather than adequately solving these issues, Lemon has 
created several problems. 
A. Contradictory Outcomes Under Lemon 
Numerous cases decided under the Lemon test have 
reached disparate results, an incongruence which lacks a rea-
sonable explanation. In cases involving public aid, the Court 
has declared several forms of aid unconstitutional, but has also 
upheld other forms of aid as constitutional and not violative of 
the Establishment Clause. The Court has invalidated a reim-
bursement to nonpublic schools for textbooks, instructional 
materials, and salaries,61 but it has validated a reimburse-
ment to non-public schools for costs associated with administer-
ing and maintaining state-mandated tests and records. 62 The 
Court has struck down a statute providing for equipment and 
instructional materials such as laboratory equipment and maps 
to (and remedial instruction by public school employees in) non-
public schools,63 while, on the other hand, it has upheld a pro-
vision of textbooks of secular subjects to non-public schools.64 
Similarly, the cases involving the creche, the menorah, and 
other religious symbols in public fora have also been inconsis-
tent.65 
B. The Inconsistency of Lemon's Application 
Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the extensive use of 
Lemon but argued that the Court has not strictly adhered to or 
always used Lemon in Establishment analysis: 
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (declaring unconstitutional a state law requiring 
daily Bible reading in public school). 
60 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See also Stone v. Graham, 449 
U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating a Kentucky statute that required public schools to 
display a copy of the Ten Commandments). 
61 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 602-03 (1971). 
62 Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980). 
63 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
64 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
65 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 
573 (1989) (disallowing a creche display on courthouse steps while permitting pub-
lic display of a menorah next to a Christmas tree); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668 (1984) (allowing city to include the creche in the city's annual Christmas dis-
play). 
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[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be 
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area. 
In two cases, the Court did not even apply the Lemon "test." 
We did not, for example, consider that analysis relevant in 
Marsh v. Chambers. Nor did we find Lemon useful in Larson 
v. Valente, where there was substantial evidence of overt 
discrimination against a particular church.66 
The Court has also referred to Lemon's three prongs as "no 
more than helpful signposts."67 
Nevertheless, Justice White and the majority held in 
Lamb's Chapel u. Center Moriches Union Free School District 
that Lemon controls Establishment adjudication.68 However, 
the Court decided another Establishment Clause case only 
eleven days after its decision in Lamb's Chapel, without even 
mentioning the Lemon test.69 The Court's inconsistent applica-
tion of the Lemon test is indeed perplexing. 
C. Current Justices' Dislike of Lemon 
Five of the currently sitting Justices of the Court have 
voiced their dissatisfaction with Lemon, namely Justices 
Scalia,70 Thomas,71 Kennedy,72 O'Connor,73 and Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist. 74 Though he was recently replaced on the 
66 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted). See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 
U.S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Committee for Pub. Educ. 
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971). 
67 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973). 
68 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 n.7 (1993). 
69 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993). See also 
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (refraining to invoke the Lemon test when 
considering clergy-offered prayers at high school graduation). 
70 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment); Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ed-
wards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("pessimistic 
evaluation" of Lemon). 
71 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2150 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment); Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
joined by, inter alios, Thomas, J., dissenting). 
72 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 
U.S. 573, 656 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
("Substantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order."). 
73 See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (voicing 
"doubts about the entanglement test"). 
74 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
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Court, Justice White has similarly expressed his discontent 
with Lemon. 75 
Justice Scalia has announced his disquiet for "the strange 
Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering 
shapes [Lemon's] intermittent use has produced."76 He argues 
that the Court has used Lemon to further (or inhibit) certain 
practices with which it agrees (or disagrees), holding that 
"[ w ]hen we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke 
it," but that "when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we 
ignore [Lemon] entirely."77 
In sum, the rigidity of Lemon's doctrinal analysis and its 
inconsistent application have created great difficulty for the 
Court in its Establishment jurisprudence. In recent years, the 
Court has failed to enhance religious accommodation despite 
originalist notions given for the First Amendment's passage. 
IV. COERCION, THE "LOST ELEMENT," RECONSIDERED 
The Grumet court's application of Lemon is problematic 
because Lemon marks a departure from originalist rationales 
for the Establishment Clause. 
senting) (Lemon test is "a constitutional theory [that] has no basis in the history of 
the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled 
results."). 
75 See, e.g., School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985) 
(White, J., dissenting); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 90-91 (White, J., dissenting); Widmar 
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); New York v. Cathedral 
Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 134-35 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Maryland 
Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment) ("I 
am no more reconciled now to Lemon I than I was when it was decided. The 
threefold test of Lemon I imposes unnecessary ... [and] superfluous tests for es-
tablishing [a First Amendment violation]."); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 
413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). 
76 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct 2141, 
2150 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia here points to the "long list of 
constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon." Id. (noting ROBERT L. CORD, 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982); Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment 
Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update, 75 CAL. L. REV. 5 (1987); Jesse 
H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 
41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1980); Philip B. Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the 
Burger Court, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1984); William P. Marshall, "We Know It 
When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 
(1986) (paraphrasing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., con-
curring)); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S. CT. REV. 1). 
77 Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2150 (citations omitted). 
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A. The Court's Unjustified Departure from the 
Coercion Element 
541 
The Court's current Establishment jurisprudence has 
evolved most significantly within the past thirty years. In the 
landmark decision of Engel v. Vitale,78 the Court initiated the 
formulation of its contemporary paradigm, holding that "[t]he 
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does 
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compul-
sion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish 
an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce 
non-observing individuals or not."79 Engel's holding was with-
out precedent. 
Prior to Engel, the Court had consistently considered coer-
cion a fundamental element of Establishment jurisprudence. In 
Cantwell v. Connecticut80the Court characterized the Estab-
lishment Clause as "forestal[ling] compulsion by law of the 
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any fonn of wor-
ship."81 Similarly, the coercion element was a central factor in 
scrutinizing public school release-time programs and Sunday 
closing laws.82 Despite these precedents, Michael McConnell 
notes that Engel introduced the legal notion "that the estab-
lishment clause does not involve an element of coercion. The 
proposition has been passed down, with an ever-lengthening 
string of citations, to be applied in cases in which so-called 
establishments can be found by courts even though nobody's 
religious liberty has been infringed in any way."83 This depar-
ture from the coercion element clearly does not square with 
earlier precedents interpreting the Establishment Clause. 
78 370 u.s. 421 (1962). 
79 !d. at 430, noted in Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of 
Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 934 (1986). Others have agreed with 
McConnell's interpretation of the originalist noncoercion argument. See, e.g., Robert 
L. Cord, Founding Intentions and the Establishment Clause: Harmonizing Accom-
modation and Separation, 10 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'v 47 (1987); Rodney K. Smith, 
Establishment Clause Analysis: A Liberty Maximizing Proposal, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PuB. PoL 'y 463 (1990). Nonetheless, McConnell is not without his critics. 
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, ''Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False Claim 
About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37 (1991). 
80 310 u.s. 296 (1940). 
81 !d. at 303. 
82 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 
u.s. 203 (1948). 
83 McConnell, supra note 79, at 936. 
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B. The Coercion Element's Essential Nature in Establishment 
Jurisprudence 
Three decades ago, former Justice Brennan rightly delin-
eated Establishment (and First Amendment) jurisprudence: 
"the line we must draw between the permissible and the imper-
missible is one which accords with history and faithfully re-
flects the understanding of the Founding Fathers."84 An exam-
ination of the Framer's intent reveals that the First Amend-
ment sought to protect against governmental coercion in reli-
gious matters. 
A primary drafter and supporter, James Madison clarified 
the wording of the First Amendment in the debates in the First 
Congress; he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that 
"Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal 
observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any 
manner contrary to their conscience."85 Arguing the proposed 
amendment was not intended to inhibit religion, Madison stat-
ed that he ''believed that the people feared one sect might ob-
tain a preeminence, or two combine together, and establish a 
religion to which they would compel others to conform."86 
Madison, in his well-known Memorial and Remonstrance 
Against Religious Assessments, holds that "religion 'can be 
directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or vio-
lence,"' and that "'compulsive support' of religion is 'unneces-
sary and unwarrantable."'87 Thus, rather than only an ele-
ment, "[compulsion] is the essence of an establishment."88 
McConnell notes that the Founding Fathers formulated the 
religion clauses with the idea of further safeguarding religious 
practice from coercion while simultaneously allowing 
noncoercive religious accommodations: 
Exponents of strict separation are embarrassed by the many 
breaches in the wall of separation countenanced by those who 
adopted the first amendment: the appointment of congressio-
nal chaplains, the provision in the Northwest Ordinance for 
84 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
85 1 Annals of Congress 730 (J. Gales ed. 1934) (Aug. 15, 1789). 
86 ld. at 731. 
87 McConnell, supra note 79, at 937-38 (citing JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL 
AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS '11'11 1, 3 (circa June 29, 
1785)). 
88 ld. at 937. 
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religious education, the resolutions calling upon the President 
to proclaim days of prayer and thanksgiving, the Indian trea-
ties under which Congress paid the salaries of priests and 
clergy, and so on. These actions, so difficult to reconcile with 
modern theories of the establishment clause, are much easier 
to understand if one sees religious coercion as the fundamen-
tal evil against which the clause is directed.89 
Thus, history allows the accommodation-not establish-
ment-of religion in the absence of compulsion. Justice 
Brennan concludes: "nothing in the Establishment Clause for-
bids the application of legislation having purely secular ends in 
such a way as to alleviate burdens upon the free exercise of an 
individual's religious beliefs."90 
In 1970, the Walz Court acknowledged the originalist ratio-
nale in a case decided three decades earlier: "In Everson [v. 
Board of Education] the Court declined to construe the Religion 
Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate 
constitutional objective as illuminated by history."91 Similarly, 
Justice Scalia has reaffirmed originalist notions: "[t]he coercion 
that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was 
coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force 
of law and threat of penalty."92 Indeed, the Establishment 
Clause "was adopted to prohibit such an establishment of reli-
gion at the federallevel."93 
In applying the Establishment Clause to the states in 
Everson v. Board of Education,94 the Court similarly prohibit-
ed state establishments of religion. It is this latter practice, re-
spondents contend, that New York has unjustifiably accom-
plished by enacting Chapter 748.95 But since provision for the 
Kiryas Joel Village School District is only a religious accommo-
dation and lacks the element of coercion, respondents' argu-
ment appears non sequitur. 
89 ld. at 939. 
90 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 295 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
91 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970). See Everson v. Board of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
92 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2683 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
93 ld. 
94 330 u.s. 1 (1947). 
95 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618 
N.E.2d 94, 96 (N.Y. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993). 
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V. PROVISION FOR THE KIRYAS JOEL VILLAGE SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT IN HARMONY WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The New York Court of Appeals invalidated Chapter 7 48 in 
light of Lemon; however, Grumet was not a unanimous deci-
sion. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bellacosa explicates sev-
eral reasons why Lemon's application is, first, misapplied,96 
and, second, leads to a result at odds with originalist Estab-
lishment rationales.97 In addition, Grumet does not reconcile 
with other accommodationist cases.98 
A. The Secular Purpose of Chapter 7 48 
Judge Bellacosa reiterated the pains with which the school 
district has sought to abide by Lemon's secular purpose prong. 
First, the school superintendent is not Hasidic. With twenty 
years of experience in special education, the superintendent is 
only concerned with giving handicapped children a secular 
education.99 Second, with a wholly secular curriculum, it is 
invalid to argue that Chapter 7 48 has given rise to a religious 
school district. The school district is a secular one, measured by 
the curriculum taught and not by the characteristics of the 
school district's students. Establishment Clause infringements 
arise "from the nature of the institution, not from the nature of 
the pupils."100 
Creation of the Kiryas Joel Village School District follows 
previous similar creations: 
No one disputes that the [New York] Legislature has the 
fundamental power to create a union free school district 
within the boundaries of a previously existing school district 
to facilitate the provision of public education to a particular 
group of students. Plaintiffs concede that approximately 20 
such school districts have been created by acts of the Legisla-
ture.101 
Plaintiffs challenge "what is otherwise an entirely secular act 
of public education administration effected by the other two 
96 See discussion infra part V.A-B. 
97 See discussion infra part V.D. 
98 See discussion infra part V.C. 
99 See Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 111-12 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
100 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248 (1977). But see discussion supra 
part II.B. 
101 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 112 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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branches of State government, on their sectarian interpretation 
of" Kiryas Joel Village's unique cultural characteristics. 102 
Despite this, "no claim is made of any alleged restrictive cove-
nants among the village's property owners, or of any alleged 
irregularity in the conduct of municipal or school district elec-
tions, or of any exclusion of non-Hasidim in any respects of 
governance, employment or availment of educational servic-
es."103 Thus, plaintiffs fail in their contentions that the school 
district was created without precedent or that the school dis-
trict is religious. 
Plaintiffs assert that "because the municipality and school 
district share identical borders and frame an enclave currently 
populated only by Satmarer Hasidim, the very existence of the 
public school district by authorization of the Legislature and 
executive constitutes, on its face, an establishment of religion 
prohibited by the United States Constitution."104 Judge 
Bellacosa concludes that "[t]he logical and inexorable extension 
of this canon would dictate the extinguishment of the Village 
itself for the identical infirmity."105 
If, according to plaintiffs' contention, the school district is 
an establishment of religion, so, too, is the incorporation of the 
village itself. Neither supposed Establishment "violation" is 
more egregious than the other. Judge Bellacosa argues that 
both are benign: just as incorporation of the village cannot be 
considered an endorsement or establishment of religion, provi-
sion for a secular public school district-though coterminous 
with the village boundaries-cannot be considered an unconsti-
tutional establishment. 106 
The secular purpose prong of Lemon is violated "only if the 
enactment was 'motivated wholly by [a religious] purpose."'107 
But because the stated purpose of Chapter 748 was to allow 
"only handicapped pupils of the Village of Kiryas Joel to receive 
a publicly supported, secular special education to which they 
are entitled," the statute is not an infraction of Lemon's secular 
purpose prong. 108 Were the school district to consolidate the 
102 ld. at 112-13 (Bellacosa, J.,dissenting). 
103 !d. at 113 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
104 !d. 
105 ld. 
106 !d. 
107 ld. (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988) (emphasis add-
ed)). 
108 ld. 
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public and private/religious schools in the village or to develop 
a sectarian curriculum in the public schools, they would unde-
niably implicate the Establishment Clause. 
The predicament of the Kiryas Joel Village School District 
and its history is a "controversy of virtually epic propor-
tions."109 Nevertheless, after the tumult subsides, only the 
students will suffer if the Court determines that Chapter 7 48 is 
indeed unconstitutional. The New York Court of Appeals' deci-
sion rests solely on Lemon's "effects" prong. 110 But the accusa-
tion that Chapter 748 is an endorsement of the Satmarer Hasi-
dim is without justification. 
B. The "Effects" Prong's Inadequate Measure of a Religious 
Establishment 
The "effects" prong has been frequently analyzed with 
respect to an "endorsement" of religion, though the Court's 
"unsettled jurisprudence in the area of possible government 
'endorsement' of religion leaves this subbranch of the Lemon 
test somewhat suspect."111 Justice O'Connor sought to give 
shape to the issue of endorsement: an "objective observer" 
would consider "the text, legislative history, and implementa-
tion of the statute" to determine whether an imprimatur of 
state approval of religion has occurred in the questioned ac-
tion.112 
Though members of the school board may mirror the reli-
gious and ethnic characteristics of the Kiryas Joel voters, such 
an occurrence is not an Establishment violation. Similar to the 
village of Kiryas Joel, other religious groups throughout this 
country may predominate politically in their respective commu-
nities: Catholics in Rhode Island, Protestants in the "Bible 
Belt" South, Mormons in Utah, or Jews in New York. These 
groups and others similarly situated find themselves politically 
influential though no one could legitimately contest their par-
ticipation in the community and its political process. 
109 ld. at 110. 
110 ld. at 99. 
111 ld. at 114 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (noting Lamb's Chapel v. Center 
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) ("the phrase 'endorsing religion,' ... cannot suffice as a rule of decision con-
sistent with our precedents and our traditions in this part of our jurisprudence")). 
112 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985). 
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Plaintiffs would have difficulty arguing that this repre-
sents a government approval of those particular predominant 
faiths or a disapproval of the minority faiths in those communi-
ties.113 In sum, though the residents of Kiryas Joel (or any 
other one-faith-predominating community) will elect members 
of their faith to public office, this does not amount to a govern-
mental endorsement of that particular religious faith. 
Judge Bellacosa argued that observers who objected to 
Chapter 748 "perhaps suffered from a predisposed hostility to 
religion in the constitutional debate sense. Truly objective ob-
servers should be able to conscientiously accept this legislation 
as secular, neutral and benign within the reasonable doubt 
spectrum."114 
Judge Bellacosa maintained that "no message of endorse-
ment for Satmar theology or its particular separatist tenets 
need necessarily or can fairly be inferred, either by objective 
third parties or by the protagonists themselves" but that "the 
people of the State of New York, as a whole, gain a compelling 
benefit in the compromise solution achieved here."115 Indeed, 
"[t]he incidental, 'attenuated' benefit to the minority Satmar 
viewpoint supports [New York's] rich pluralistic tradition and 
does not diminish, but rather enhances, the common good."116 
Justice Scalia argues that "maintaining respect for the 
religious observances of others is a fundamental civic virtue 
that government (including the public schools) can and should 
cultivate."117 Such accommodation through respect does not 
equal an establishment of religion. "[The Court's] precedents 
plainly contemplate that on occasion some advancement of 
religion will result from governmental action."118 
Justice Scalia has shown the problematic nature of the 
"endorsement" test: "[w]hat a strange notion, that a Constitu-
113 Cf Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(where "endorsement" of one or more religions "sends a message to nonadherents 
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an ac. 
companying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community."). 
114 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618 
N.E.2d 94, 115 (N.Y. 1993) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), cert. grant-
ed, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993). 
115 ld. 
116 ld. 
117 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2682 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The 
majority in Weisman failed to agree with Justice Scalia's axiom. ld. at 2658. 
118 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984). 
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tion which itself gives 'religion in general' preferential treat-
ment (I refer to the Free Exercise Clause) forbids endorsement 
of religion in general."119 Only by effectuating the purposes of 
both religion clauses can the two be harmonious. Indeed, 
those who adopted our Constitution . . . believed that the 
public virtues inculcated by religion are a public good. It 
suffices to point out that during the summer of 1789, when it 
was in the process of drafting the First Amendment, Congress 
enacted the famous Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1789, 
Article III of which provides, "Religion, morality, and knowl-
edge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of 
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be 
encouraged."120 
Just as tolerance of religious speech (in an open forum) 
"does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious 
sects or practices,"121 neither can Chapter 748 be construed 
as an official state sanction of Satmarer Hasidic religious prac-
tices. 
C. Consistency in Accommodation 
Justice Brennan stated that "even when the government is 
not compelled to do so by the Free Exercise Clause, it may to 
some extent act to facilitate the opportunities of individuals to 
practice their religion."122 The provision of secular education 
for handicapped students in the Kiryas Joel Village School 
District thus does not amount to an Establishment infraction. 
The Court has accommodated the particular idiosyncratic 
religious practices of other faiths. For example, fundamentalist 
Christians have the right to deny a pregnant, married teacher 
from teaching at their parochial school; their religion holds that 
a woman should remain home to nurture her preschool chil-
dren. 123 The Court has upheld the right of the Mormon 
119 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 
2151 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
120 1 Stat. 52 (1789), quoted in Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2151 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). 
121 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981). 
122 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
See also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263 (invalidating a university regulation that prohib-
ited religious use of university buildings). 
123 Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 
(1986). 
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Church to deny employment to someone who does not subscribe 
to particular important Mormon beliefs.124 The Court has ac-
knowledged the right of Amish parents to keep their children 
from attending public schools (beyond the eighth grade); the 
Amish strive to avoid worldly ideals such as competition and 
the pursuit of material wealth, mores their children may wit-
ness in public schools. 125 To remain neutral, the Court should 
also accommodate Satmarer Hasidic religious practices. 
The Court ruled in Zobrest that providing a sign language 
interpreter for a deaf parochial student was not violative of the 
Establishment Clause since such a service was "neutral" and, 
at most, provided religion only an "attenuated" benefit. 126 
Just as this sectarian-related aid was declared constitutional in 
Zobrest, Chapter 748 also falls within Establishment parame-
ters; it even steers clear of governmental aid in a parochial 
setting. The measure does not fully accommodate the religious 
tenets of the Satmarer; quite the contrary, though it may pro-
vide for the "separationist" element, it represents a compromise 
of Satmar beliefs: 
the new public school district offers programs and services at 
odds with many basic precepts of Satmarer Hasidism. Secu-
larism itself is antithetical to Hasidism, yet secularism is the 
quid pro quo imposed by the State for these Village residents 
to avail themselves in this way of State-regulated special edu-
cational services for their handicapped youngsters .... 
[While] English is the language of instruction within the 
school[,] Yiddish is the medium of communication within the 
village. In contrast to the method of instruction at the sectari-
an schools in the Village, male and female students at the 
public special education school are grouped together for teach-
ing purposes at the special school; instructional materials are 
not based upon the sex of the student being taught; female 
employees are not prohibited from exercising authority over 
male employees; the physical appearance of the building is 
secular, including the significant absence of mezuzahs on the 
doorposts; and the dress of the employees is secular in ap-
pearance. 127 
124 Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). For an exposition of religious group rights in 
light of Amos and Dayton Christian Schools, see Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99. 
125 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
126 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2463-67 (1993). 
See discussion supra part II.B. 
127 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618 
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With these compromises, the Satmarer Hasidim have shown 
their willingness to abide by the law. Governor Cuomo empha-
sized that "this new school district must take pains to avoid 
conduct that violates the separation of church and state" but 
that he believed "they will be true to their commitment."128 
By ensuring the secular nature of the school for its handi-
capped children, it is true that the "democratically elected 
Board of Trustees of the Kiryas Joel Village School District has 
strained to create a nonsectarian educational environment 
which is faithful to the secular command of the statute."129 
Judge Bellacosa reaffirms that "this effort is indicative of the 
secular compromise the Hasidim community was willing to ab-
sorb to allow the special education needs of their children to be 
met within a public, neutral, nondenominational setting."130 
Yet the "establishment of a union free school district geo-
graphically identical to an incorporated municipality ... should 
not be stigmatized as aid to a particular denomination, simply 
because the inhabitants of that municipality are predominantly 
or even exclusively members of that denomination."131 To rule 
this an Establishment violation would abrogate the Free Exer-
cise Clause; Judge Bellacosa affirms that invalidating the legis-
lation at issue "deprives the citizens of Kiryas Joel of certain 
educational prerogatives in contravention of their fundamental 
right to self-governance. Their free exercise of religion is also 
inextricably implicated and compromised, simply because they 
have chosen to live and believe in a particular way together in 
an incorporated village."132 
Because the "government must be neutral when it comes to 
competition between sects,"133 denial of an accommodation 
here, contrasted with accommodation of the Amish, Mormons, 
fundamentalist Christians, and other religious groups, amounts 
to a non-neutral jurisprudence. Such a practice is itself uncon-
stitutional. 
N.E.2d 94, 115-17 (N.Y. 1993) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 
544 (1993). 
128 Governor's Approval Mem., 1989 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN., at 325, noted in 
Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 117 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
129 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 117 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
130 ld. 
131 !d. at 117-18 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
132 !d. at 118 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
133 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952). 
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D. The Lack of Coercion in Chapter 748 
While Chapter 748 neither coerces nor influences religious 
belief, it does facilitate the exercise of the Satmarer Hasidic 
faith; this accommodation cannot be seen as an establishment 
of religion. McConnell reiterates the need to reexamine Lemon: 
Doctrinally, renewed attention to coercion suggests that the 
Court's three-part test for an establishment of religion should 
be modified. A rule that forbids government actions with the 
purpose or effect of advancing religion fails to distinguish 
between efforts to coerce and influence religious belief and 
action, on the one hand, and efforts to facilitate the exercise 
of one's chosen faith, on the other. 134 
Under an accommodationist paradigm that applies a 
noncoercion analysis, government in its ideological neutrality 
will neither advance nor inhibit religion, a result Lemon has 
failed to achieve. 135 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The three-prong Lemon test must be reconsidered in light 
of several factors: the contradictory outcomes it engenders, 136 
the inconsistency of its application, 137 most of the current 
Justices' dislike of Lemon/38 and its departure from a 
noncoercion paradigm. 139 
Coercion was the element against which the Founding 
Fathers safeguarded America; they viewed the religion clauses 
as a means of enhancing the free exercise of religious beliefs 
while protecting against an unconstitutional coercive establish-
ment of religion. The Court's departure from coercion analysis 
was without justification. In the absence of compulsion, govern-
ment accommodation of religious beliefs is paramount to a 
flourishing people. The Lemon test is thus inadequate as it 
does not adequately measure a coercive element. 
Chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989 is not violative of the 
Establishment Clause; the Kiryas Joel Village School District, 
134 McConnell, supra note 79, at 940. But see Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 
2649, 2658 (1992) (holding even "subtle and indirect" coercion unconstitutional). 
135 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
136 See discussion supra part III.A. 
137 See discussion supra part III.B. 
138 See discussion supra part III.C. 
139 See discussion supra part IV.A-B. 
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though an accommodation, cannot be considered an establish-
ment of the Satmarer Hasidic religion. To disallow the creation 
of a school district that provides a secular education to Kiryas 
Joel's handicapped students would implicate the Free Exercise 
Clause. Lemon's "effects" prong insufficiently appraises estab-
lishments of religion. A failure by the Court to find in favor of 
the school district would further compound an already inconsis-
tent Establishment jurisprudence. Because Chapter 748 does 
not involve an element of coercion, provision for the school 
district is constitutional. Indeed, a reformulation of Establish-
ment jurisprudence that includes the coercion element in its 
paradigm satisfies both originalist notions and society's current 
needs. 
The Court's previous recognition of the need for neutrality, 
noncoercion, and accommodation warrants reconsideration. In 
conclusion, "[ w ]hen the state . . . cooperates with religious 
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectar-
ian needs, it follows the best of our traditions."140 The Consti-
tution "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely 
tolerance, of all religions .... Anything less would require the 
'callous indifference' we have said was never intended by the 
Establishment Clause."141 
Judge Bellacosa leaves a reminder for the Court to consid-
er in its adjudication of Grumet: "A culturally diverse Nation, 
which proclaims itself under a banner, E Pluribus Unum, ... 
[cannot] penalize and encumber religious uniqueness" unless it 
"strikes the 'E Pluribus' and leaves only the 'Unum.' "142 
Scott S. Thomas 
140 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952). 
141 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (citations omitted). 
142 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618 
N.E.2d 94, 118 (N.Y. 1993) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 
(1993). 
